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Abstract
Logical models of the mind focus on beliefs, and how one reasons with beliefs.
But we also have desires, intentions, preferences, and other attitudes and ar-
guably we reason with them, particularly when making decisions. To enable a
logical analysis of someones psychology and decision-making, we generalize three
classic logical desiderata on beliefs consistency, completeness, and implication-
closedness towards multiple attitudes. The three resulting logicaldesiderata on
our psychology contrast with the classic notion of rationality requirements: re-
quirements of having transitive preferences, non-contradictory beliefs, non-acratic
intentions, intentions consistent with preferences, and so on. We prove a theorem
that connects the logical desiderata to rationality requirements: each of the three
logical desiderata (generalized to multiple attitudes) is equivalent to the satisfac-
tion of a certain class of rationality requirements. This result connects logic with
choice theory and psychology, and has implications for whether reasoning can make
our attitudes consistent, complete, and closed.
1 Introduction
Logic is extensively used to study our beliefs, and how we form new beliefs through
reasoning. But in fact we possess, and reason with, multiple attitudes: beliefs,
intentions, desires, preferences, hopes, wishes, and so on. We for instance form
intentions based on preferences and beliefs, or preferences based on preferences
and beliefs. Such multi-attitude reasoning(as we call it) di¤ers fundamentally
from reasoning with beliefs the sort of reasoning addressed in logic. Logic nds it
hard to go beyond belief due to its inherently truth-oriented nature, as explained
in Section 2. By contrast, the multiplicity in attitudes has long been recognized
and addressed in other disciplines like philosophy, choice theory, psychology, AI
theory, and cognitive science, at least when these disciplines study the mind or
decision-making.
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We aim to help extend the logical analysis of the mind beyond beliefs, towards
multiple attitudes. The goal is a logicalunderstanding of psychology, internal
reasoning, and action. When are our attitudes consistent? When are they com-
plete? When are they implication-closed? Such questions matter also to articial
intelligence, where the goal is more and more to design intelligent systems or ro-
bots that reason and perform actions in di¤erent environments. Such an intelligent
system cannot properly select its actions if it only possesses beliefs, however per-
fect (trueand complete) these beliefs might be. The system also needs other
attitudes, perhaps preferences or intentions, in order to bridge the gap between
beliefs and actions. Believing that a particular action would save a life is not
enough of a basis for doing it: an intention (or preference, goal, desire etc.) to
save a life is also needed.
We describe an agent not by his belief set, but by his constitutionwhich sum-
marizes all the various attitudes; and we describe his reasoning as a process not just
from old to new beliefs, but from old to new attitudes of various kinds. Within this
multi-attitude framework, we propose general denitions of when a constitution
is consistent, complete, or closed (under implication), and prove a theorem that
relates these three logical desiderata to the choice-theoretic or philosophical no-
tion of rationality requirements (examples of which are: transitivity of preferences,
non-contradiction of beliefs, non-acrasia of intentions, and intention/preference
compatibility). This result has implications about how multi-attitude reasoning
can (or not) improvethe constitution.
The philosophical foundation of this paper is John Broomes (2013) theory of
rationality and reasoning, which we aim to formalise and extend. We shall draw
on the formal notions of constitutions, rationality, and multi-attitude introduced
in Dietrich et al. (2019).
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Figure 1 displays the general picture of agency underlying our and Broomes
approach, and the broad structure of an intelligent system one might design. On
that picture, the agent entertains multiple attitudes (Figure 1 restricts attention to
beliefs, preferences, and intentions), which together form his mental constitution.
Reasoning leads to revision of the constitution: new attitudes are formed based
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on existing ones. Attitudes can also change through external input or learning
rather than internalreasoning: beliefs can change through empirical observation,
and preferences through evaluative input. By contrast, intentions give rise to
behaviour, the outputof the cognitive system. This paper sets aside an analysis
of external learning and how the constitution should respond to it; this would
require a separate revision theory (perhaps a multi-attitude analogue of AGM-
style belief revision; see Alchourrón et al. 1985).
Figure 1 is broadly in line with how many AI theorists, psychologists and cog-
nitive scientists construe of agency (e.g., Broersen et al. 2002). [Add literature
here, including on BDI-logic, e.g., Wiebe van der Hook.] Three main character-
istics distinguish our Broomean model from existing multi-attitude models in AI.
First, the agents diverse attitudes are all modelled in the same unied way (as
attitudes towards objects, typically propositions), and analysed as a single system,
the mental constitution. Second, we apply logical concepts such as consistency,
completeness and closedness to that totality. Third, we construe of reasoning as a
process to improve rationality of the mental constitution.
In an important and di¤erent sense, logicians have addressed multiple attitudes,
namely through modal operators representing belief, knowledge, desire, and the
like. This approach to multiple attitudes pursues di¤erent goals. Inferences in
modal logic capture not how the agent forms these attitudes through reasoning,
but how a third-party analyst can infer something about the agents attitudes 
still a classical form of belief formation. This is not reasoning with (formation
of) multiple attitudes, but reasoning with (formation of) beliefs about multiple
attitudes of someone else. We come back to this distinction in Section 8.
2 Why does ordinary logic not go beyond beliefs
when studying the mind?
This section considers does not yet address those important modal logics in which
attitudes are internalisedinto sentences or propositions through attitude oper-
ators (like belief or desire operators). That modal-logical approach to go beyond
belief attitudes is addressed in a later section. For now we ask whether logic could
go beyond belief in the attitudes taken towards the sentences or propositions of
the language, setting aside the modal-logical internalisationof attitudes into sen-
tences.
The di¢ culty of logic to go beyond belief when studying psychology is routed
in the very nature of the logical approach. Logic deals with propositions or facts
about the world, expressed by sentences. Logic is representationalof an external
reality, like belief is and unlike desire. Indeed, not even our beliefs (let alone our
desires or intentions) are the primary concern of logic, because logic is primarily
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about the world, not the mind. But where logic does address the mind, it notori-
ously addresses beliefs: propositions stand for beliefs (not desires, ...), and logical
entailments stand for belief formation, i.e., reasoning with beliefs (not desires, ...).
It would be di¢ cult to simply re-interpret logical entailment as a model of desire
formation (or intention formation, ...). Could desiring p lead to desiring p or q
just because p entails p or q? Could a tautology p be desired (intended, ...) just
because it is logically true, i.e., entailed by anything? One may doubt this.1 But
even if logical entailment were successful in modelling reasoning with desires (or
intentions, ...), then we would not have modelled multi-attitude reasoning, i.e.,
reasoning with di¤erent attitudes at a time. Reasoning with desires is still mono-
attitude reasoning, with the unorthodox attitude of desire, not belief. Once we
start mixing attitudes, logical entailment fails altogether as a model of reason-
ing: for instance, desiring p and believing if p then q does not lead to intending q,
since the fact that p and if p then q logically entail q is irrelevant to multi-attitude
reasoning. In sum, the attempt of reducing the process of reasoning from some
attitudes to another to an entailment between the contents of these attitudes is
shaky if the attitudes are not beliefs , and fails altogether if the attitudes are of
di¤erent types. Logical entailment also fails altogether when it comes to mod-
elling mono-attitude reasoning with a two-place attitude, held towards pairs of
propositions. In particular, reasoning with preferences (Broome 2006) has noth-
ing to do with logical entailment, already because the contents of preferences are
proposition pairs whereas entailments hold between single propositions. Logical
entailment can explain why our preferences of p to q and of q to r let us form a
preference p to r.
We have just highlighted why logic can hardly go beyond belief in studying the
dynamic phenomenon of reasoning. Can logic at least help with the static task
of modelling someones multiple attitudes at a given time? Logicians routinely
model someones static beliefs through a belief setcontaining all currently be-
lieved propositions (or sentences). One could add a desire setcontaining desired
propositions, an intention setcontaining intended propositions, and so on. This
does not lead far however. For one, the three standard logical desiderata on belief
sets  logical consistency, completeness, and deductive closedness become less
compelling when applied to desire sets, intentions set, or the like. For another, we
need not just care about consistency, closedness or completeness within each type
of attitude, but also across attitudes. This is why we shall generalize these three
logical desiderata to desiderata on the totality of an agents attitudes.
1Even reasoning with beliefs need not follow logical entailment: it need not be deductive
(truth-preserving. This has led to the development of non-monotonic logics and other logics
of inductive reasoning. These logics would however not help us much with modelling reasoning
with desires or intentions.
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3 Our multi-attitude framework
To go beyond an agents beliefs, we work not with his belief set, but with his
constitution. While the belief set contains all currently believed propositions,
such as it snows or I can go skying, the constitution contains all currently
held content-attitude pairs or mental states, such as (it snows; belief) and (I
go skying; intention).
Our framework builds on two simple primitives (discussed in more detail in the
philosophical companion paper Dietrich et al. 2019):
 a xed non-empty set L of objects of attitudes. One can think of them as pro-
positions, sentences, or (in choice-theoretic applications) as choice options,
moves of other players, nature moves, or other constructs.
 a xed non-empty set A of attitudes or more exactly attitude types, such
as belief, intention, and preference. Each attitude comes with (i) a domain
D  L of possible objects of that attitude, and (ii) a number of places of that
attitude n 2 f1; 2; :::g. A might contain onlyone-place attitudes of belief
and intention and a two-place attitude of preference, each with some domain
of possible objects. Attitudes in A might have universal domain D = L; or
one might restrict the domain of intention to propositions under the agents
control, and the domain of belief to propositions beyond the agents control.
For any one-place attitude a in A and proposition p in its domain, we can form
the mental state (p; a), representing attitude a towards p (e.g., belief that p, or
desire that p). For any two-place attitudes a in A and propositions p and q in
its domain, we can form the mental state (p; q; a), representing attitude a towards
(p; q) (e.g., preference of p over q). In general:
Denition 1 A (mental) state is a tuple (p1; :::; pn; a) called attitude a towards
p1; :::; pn where a is an attitude in A, n is as number of places, and p1; :::; pn
belong to as domain. Let M denote the set of all mental states.
Terminology: We say attitudenot just for attitude types in A (like desire), but
sometimes also for mental states in M (like desire that it rains). Mental states
whose attitude type is belief (intention, preference, ...) are called belief states
(intention states, preference states, ...), or simply beliefs (intentions, preferences,
...).
Denition 2 A (mental) constitution is a set C  M of mental states, rep-
resenting the totality of an agents current mental states.
A notion or theory of rationality deems certain constitutions rational, and the
other irrational. We thus identify a theory of rationality with the set of constitu-
tions it deemed rational:
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Denition 3 A notion or theory of rationality is a set T of constitutions.
Constitutions inside (outside) T are called (ir)rational according to the theory,
or T -(ir)rational.
4 Three applications
We now give two logicalapplications, and one choice-theoreticapplication.
Application A: syntactic or intensional model of propositions. Let pro-
positions be dened as sentences: L is the set of all sentences of some suitable
formal language, such as the language of classical propositional logic, or a richer
language with modal operators and non-material conditionals, or a language of
a predicate logic. The syntactic model of propositions is appealing if one thinks
that propositions truly are sentences (an implausible metaphysical view) or, more
interestingly, if one thinks a proposition is the meaning (intension, Sinn) of a sen-
tence and can be formally represented by this sentences itself. In the second case,
one has an intensional notion of propositions.
An example of a theory of rationality is the set T of all constitutionsC satisfying
the following conditions:
 Modus ponens: for all p; q 2 L, if (p; bel); (if p then q; bel) 2 C then (q; bel) 2
Cg.
 Non-contradictory desires: for all p 2 L, if (p; des) 2 C then (not p; des) 62 C.
 Enkrasia: for all p 2 L, if (obligatorily p; bel) 2 C then (p; int) 2 C.
 Necessary means: for all p; q 2 L, if (p; int); (p only if I intend that q; bel) 2
C then (q; int) 2 C.
In these conditions the sentences are stated informally; for instance, not p stands
for :p, and obligatorily p for O(p), where : and O are negation and obligation
operators of the language, respectively. I have implicitly assumed two things.
First, the formal language is su¢ ciently expressive has enoughoperators for
making formal sense of all the sentences considered.2 Second, the set of attitudes A
contains at least the attitudes used above, i.e., the one-place attitudes of belief bel,
desire des and intention int, which we take to have universal domain for simplicity.
Of course, A might contain other attitudes.
Application B: semantic or extensional model of propositions. Let pro-
positions be dened as sets of possible worlds: L consists of all subsets of a given
2To express non-contradictory desires the language must contain a negation operator; for
modus ponens it must contain an if-then operator (a material or non-material one, depending on
the rendition of the principle); for encrasia it must contain an ought/obligation operator; and for
encrasia it must contain an intention operator, and an if-then (or equivalently only-if) operator
(which may again be material or not).
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set of possible worlds 
.3 This model cannot distinguish between logically equi-
valent propositions: it neither snows nor rains and It is not the case that it
snows or rains are represented by the same set of worlds, hence the same pro-
position. This can be problematic because mental states often ignore equivalence:
we often believe or intend something without believing or intending something
equivalent, say out of unawareness of the equivalence. Modelling propositions as
sets of worlds reects an extensional notion of proposition: propositions are taken
to be the reference (extension, denoted thing, Bedeutung) of sentences, not the
meaning (intension, Sinn) of sentences. Working with sets of worlds rather than
sentences is often called a semanticapproach. This terminology assumes that
semantics is about reference (extension). We hasten to add that one could instead
take semantics to be concerned with meaning (intension), on grounds of etymology
and natural use. Then Application A rather than B would qualify as semantic.
One can again dene a theory of rationality by imposing the four conditions
in Application A, i.e., modus ponens, non-contradictory desires, encrasia and ne-
cessary means. Formally, this theory T consists of all constitutions C satisfying
the four conditions in Application A. Given the extensional notion of proposi-
tions, the propositions in these conditions now stand for particular sets of worlds,
not for sentences as in Application A. For instance, not p stands for 
np, and
if p then q (when interpreted materially) for (
np) [ q. Some propositions in
the conditions, such as obligatorily p, involve non-truthfunctional operators which
cannot be dened through standard set-theoretic operations like complement or
union. We therefore need to add appropriate modal operators as part of the se-
mantic model, such as an obligation operator.4
Application C: choice under certainty. Let us model choice theory in its
simplest version. Consider a xed non-empty set X of potential choice options,
e.g., food options. Our model contains no choices: they are not mental states.
Instead it contains intentions, the mental counterparts of choices. The agent faces
a feasible set, the non-empty set Y  X of currently feasible options; it enters our
(mentalistic) model through what the agent believes to be the feasible set. It sum,
3More generally, L could be some algebra of subsets of 
. By letting L contain only certain
subsets, we can limit attention to propositions that are expressible or accessible to the agents
cognitive system.
4A one-place semantic operator F (e.g., an obligation or belief or intention operator)
is a function mapping propositions p  
 to propositions F (p)  
. One should think of
obligatorily p as F (p) for an obligation operator F ; F (p) contains the worlds in which it
is obligatory that p. A two-place semantic operator (e.g., a non-material if-then operator, or
a preference operator) maps pairs of propositions to propositions. Some semantic operator are
truth-functional: their output is a set-theoretic (Boolean) combination of their input. Examples
are the notoperator given by F (p) = 
np, the andoperator given by F (p; q) = p\ q, and the
material if-then operator given by F (p; q) = (
np) [ q. But many relevant semantic operators,
like the obligation operator, are not truth-function; they are modal.
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we use mental states of three types:
 (x; int), representing intention to choose option x,
 (x; y;%), representing weak preference of option x to option y,
 (Y; bel), representing belief that the feasible set is Y (2 2Xnf?g).
In the philosophical companion paper we work out an alternative choice-theoretic
model which uses not a weak-preference attitude %, but instead attitudes  and
 of strict preference and indi¤erence. Working with weak preference is choice-
theoretically more common, but philosophically less natural because weak prefer-
ence is arguably not a basicattitude, but a compositeattitude which reduces
to having either a strict preference or an indi¤erence.
Since the objects of attitudes are either options or feasible sets, let L contain
all options and all feasible sets: L = X [ (2Xnf?g). Those who think of attitudes
as having propositional content can re-interpret any option x as the proposition
that x is chosen, and any feasible set Y as the proposition that Y is the feasible
set.
The set of attitudes is A = fint; bel;%g, where
 int is a one-place attitude of intention, with domain X,
 % is a two-place attitude of weak preference, with domain X,
 bel is a one-place attitude of (feasibility) belief, with domain 2Xnf?g.
The received choice-theoretic view is that a full rationality agent holds trans-
itive and complete preferences and chooses what he most prefers among what
is feasible. Translated into our framework, and modulo the di¤erence between
choiceand intention to choose, and between feasibleand believed-feasible,
this orthodox view deems a constitution C to be rational if and only if it satises
ve conditions:
 Preference transitivity: of all x; y; z 2 X, if (x; y;%); (y; z;%) 2 C then
(x; z;%) 2 C.
 Preference completeness: for all x; y 2 X, (x; y;%) 2 C or (y; x;%) 2 C.
 Economic enkrasia or preference maximization: if there is a most preferred
believed-feasible option, then one such option is intended. Formally: for all
feasible sets Y 2 2Xnf?g, if (Y; bel) 2 C and there is an x 2 Y such that
(x; y;%) 2 C for all y 2 Y , then (x; int) 2 C for some such x 2 Y .
 No conicting intentions: There is at most one option x 2 X such that
(x; int) 2 C.
 Determinate feasibility beliefs: There is exactly one feasible set Y 2 2Xnf?g
such that (Y; bel) 2 C.
So, within our framework we can dene the classictheory of rationality as the the-
ory T consisting of those constitutions which satisfy the above conditions. Several
other theories of rationality could be advanced, and have been advanced within less
classical choice theory; they drop or replace some of the conditions, for instance
preference completeness.
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Our label economic encrasiaemphasizes the analogy to encrasia as standardly
construed in philosophy. While standard encrasia requires a normative belief to
imply an intention, economic encrasia requires particular preferences to imply an
intention.
5 Partial forms of rationality: consistency, com-
pleteness, closedness
Having a rational constitution is an ideal that we rarely meet. We now intro-
duce three weaker desiderata. They are inspired by three logicaldesiderata on
someones beliefs:
(a) Consistency. This says: do not believe mutually inconsistent propositions,
i.e., propositions which cannot be simultaneously true. This is a global
version of consistency. Local consistency merely says: do not believe a
proposition and also its negation.
(b) Completeness. In its localversion, this says: believe any proposition or its
negation. In its globalversion, it says: believe a member of each set of
propositions which are mutually exhaustive, i.e., cannot be simultaneously
false. So, believe not only a member of each trivialexhaustive set of type
fp; not pg (as in the local version), but also a member of each non-trivial
exhaustive set, including sets of type fp; q; not-p or not-qg and many other
sets.
(c) Closedness. This says: believe all consequences of your beliefs, i.e., all beliefs
that must be true if your existing beliefs are true.
Generalizing these three concepts will allow us to analyse an agents constitution
his full psychology from a logical angle. But when should we count his con-
stitution as consistent? As complete? As closed? The three (informal) denitions
(a)-(c) cannot be directly translated from beliefs to multiple attitudes. Ultimately
this is because we cannot appeal to the notion of truthand possible worldin the
realm of desires or other non-representational attitudes. Semantic denitions of
consistency, (global) completeness, and closedness are unavailable, simply because
there is no multi-attitude semantics. Some might try to introduce such semantics;
it is unclear whether this can be meaningful, but certainly such semantics would
have to look very di¤erent. We will instead use the notion of rationality to dene
the three logical desiderata. So to say, rationality is our substitute for semantics.
To take inspiration from beliefs, let us rst see how the denitions (a)-(c) can be
re-expressed in terms of rationality of beliefs (we will do this informally; for details
see Appendix B). Think of someones belief set as rational if it is consistent,
complete and closed (closedactually follows from consistentand complete).
This denes rationality of beliefs in terms of the three desiderata, the opposite
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of what we wish to do. But the backwards strategy  going from rationality
towards the three desiderata  also works for beliefs: one can characterize the
three desiderata on beliefs in terms of rationality of beliefs. As shown in Appendix
B, a belief set is
 consistent if and only if it becomes rational by suitably adding (zero or more)
beliefs;
 complete in the global sense if and only it becomes rational by suitably
removing (zero or more) beliefs;
 closed if and only if it contains each belief b which it entails, where entails
means equivalently that b belongs to each rational belief set containing at
least all current beliefs.
These characterizations of the three desiderata in terms of rationality provide a
recipe for extending the desiderata to multiple attitudes, including a recipe for
extending entailment:
Denition 4 Given a theory of rationality, a constitution C  M entails a
mental state m 2M if all rational extensions C 0  C contain m.
Denition 5 Given a theory of rationality, a constitution C is
 consistent if there is a rational constitution C 0  C,
 complete if there is a rational constitution C 0  C,
 closed if C contains each mental state which it entails.
These denitions make intuitive sense, since they treat a constitution C as
 consistent if the C-states do not rule one another out, i.e., if one can ration-
ally hold all C-states (among other states),
 complete if the C-states are su¢ cient, i.e., if one can rationally hold no other
states than C-states,
 closed if no other state rationally follows from the C-states.
But do these three concepts truly generalize their classic belief-theoretic coun-
terparts? They do, because they reduce to the classic concepts in the belief-only
case where A contains only the belief attitude bel, i.e., where constitutions corres-
pond to belief sets. This is established by the following result, re-stated formally
in Appendix B:
Proposition 1 (informal statement) In the belief-only case A = fbelg, a consti-
tution is
 consistent in our sense if and only if the corresponding belief set is classically
consistent,
 complete in our sense if and only if the corresponding belief set is classically
complete (understood globally),
 closed in our sense if and only if the corresponding belief set is classically
closed.
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6 How do consistency, completeness, and closed-
ness relate to rationality requirements?
While logicians typically focus on abstractdesiderata like consistency, complete-
ness or closedness, choice theorists and philosophers instead focus on concrete
rationality requirements like modus ponens, preference completeness, necessary
means, and the other requirements listed in Section 4. This di¤erence in the ap-
proach to rationality is striking. But the two worlds can be linked. Of the various
concreterequirements, some have a consistency avour (e.g., non-contradictory
desires); others have a completeness avour (e.g., preference completeness); and
yet others have a closedness avour (e.g., modus ponens, preference transitivity,
and necessary means).
This link holds not just intuitively, but can be turned into a general theorem,
to be presented in this section. But rst we must dene the generic notion of a
requirementof rationality, and distinguish between three types of requirements,
following Dietrich et al. (2019). In most general terms, a requirementis some-
thing which a constitution may satisfy or violate. Therefore we simply identify a
requirement with the set of constitutions satisfying it:
Denition 6 A requirement is (just like a theory of rationality) a set R of con-
stitutions; constitutions in R satisfy the requirement, others violate it.
Each of the conditions in Application AC denes a schema requirement. For
instance, encrasia denes the requirement R = fC : (obligatorily p; bel) 2 C )
(p; int) 2 Cg for each p 2 L, and preference completeness denes the requirement
R = fC : (x; y;%) 2 C or (y; x;%) 2 Cg for each x; y 2 X.
A theory of rationality implies (makes) a bunch of requirements:
Denition 7 The requirements of a given theory of rationality T (or ra-
tionality requirements) are those requirements R which follow from T , i.e., for
which T  R.
For instance, consider the classicaltheory of rationality T in Application C,
which deems those constitutions as rational which satisfy all conditions listed there:
preference transitivity, preference completeness, and so on. What requirements
does this theory make? For one, all the mentioned conditions dene (schemas
of) requirements of the theory. These requirements function as the axiomsused
to dene the theory. But the theory makes many more requirements: all logical
consequences of the axioms.
We distinguish between three salient types of requirements. Most requirements
one encounters are of one of these types.
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Denition 8 A consistency requirement is a requirement R that forbids hold-
ing certain mental states simultaneously; formally, R = fC : not F  Cg for some
non-empty set F of states, the forbidden set.
Non-contradictory desires is a schema of consistency requirements, with forbid-
den sets F = f(p; des); (not p; des)g (p 2 L). No conicting intentions is another
consistency requirement, with forbidden set F = f(x; int) : x 2 Xg.
Denition 9 A completeness requirement is a requirement R that forbids
holding none of certain mental states; formally, R = fC : C \ U 6= ?g for some
non-empty set U of states, the unavoidable set.
Preference completeness is a schema of completeness requirements, with un-
avoidable sets f(x; y;); (y; x;); (x; y;)g (x; y; z 2 X). In Application C one
might consider the completeness requirement which demands believing in some
feasible set; the unavoidable set is U = f(Y; bel) : Y  2Xnf?gg.
Denition 10 A closedness requirement is a requirement R demanding that
if certain mental states are held then a certain mental state is held; formally,
R = fC : P  C ) c 2 Cg for some set of (premise) states P and some
(conclusion) state c.
There are many schemas of closedness requirements, such as: modus ponens
(take P = f(p; bel); (if p then q; bel)g and c = (q; bel)), preference transitivity
(take P = f(x; y;%); (y; z;%)g and c = f(x; z;%)g), and necessary means (take
P = f(p; int); (p only if I intend that q; bel)g and c = (q; int)).
In sum, we now have a way to classify requirements into three types, and to
analyse a theory of rationality in terms of consistency, completeness, and closedness
requirements it makes.
The following result establishes a tight link between the choice-theoretic no-
tion of rationality requirements and our general notions of rationality, consistency,
completeness, and closedness.
Theorem 1 Given any theory of rationality T 6= ?, a constitution C is
(a) consistent if and only if it satises all consistency requirements of T ,
(b) complete if and only if it satises all completeness requirements of T ,
(c) closed if and only if it satises all closedness requirements of T ,
(d) fully rational if and only if it satises all requirements of T .
This result connects the choice-theoretic or philosophical approach focused on
rationality requirements (like transitivity and enkrasia) with a logicalor holistic
approach focused on general structural desiderata like consistency or closedness.
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7 Reasoning with multiple attitudes
The constitution of normal people is usually neither rational, nor even consistent,
complete, or closed. But we often reason in the idea to improveour constitution.
This is reasoning with multiple attitudes, not reasoning with beliefs, the ordin-
ary focus of logic. But can such reasoning make us consistent in our attitudes?
Or complete? Or closed? Or even fully rational? This enquiry is a cousin of
Broomes central question. Broome asks whether reasoning helps us achieve con-
crete rationality requirements, such as transitivity or encrasia. Broomes question
is formally addressed in our companion paper Dietrich et al. (2019). Our present
focus is not on achieving concrete rationality requirements, but on achieving the
abstract desiderata of consistency, completeness, closedness, or even full rational-
ity. Theorem 1 has related the abstract desiderata with rationality requirements.
We should therefore expect parallels between reasoning towards rationality re-
quirements (analysed in the companion paper) and reasoning towards consistency,
completeness, closedness, or even full rationality (analysed in this section). Such
parallels will indeed emerge.
7.1 Reasoning rules and the revision of constitution
This subsection formalises Broomes notion of multi-attitude reasoning, as also
done in the companion paper. Reasoningmeans forming new attitudes based
on existing ones, e.g., forming the intention to study based on the belief that I
ought to study (a single premise), or forming this intention based on the intention
to make a change and the belief that making a change requires studying (two
premises). Formally:
Denition 11 A reasoning rule is a pair (P; c) of a set of (premise) states
P  M and a (conclusion) state c 2 M (representing the rule of forming state
c based on the states P ). The revision of a constitution C through a rule
r = (P; c) is the constitution Cjr obtained by adding the conclusion state provided
all premise states are held, i.e.
Cjr =
(
C [ fcg if P  C (the rule appliesto C)
C if P 6 C (the rule does not applyto C).
The rules underlying the two informal examples have the conclusion state
c = (I study; int) and the set of premise states given by either P = f(I ought
to study; bel)g or P = f(I make a change; int); (making a change requires
studying; bel)g. Reasoning from a (weak) preference of x to y and of y to z towards
one of x to z uses the rule with set of premise states P = f(x; y;%); (y; z;%)g and
conclusion state (x; z;%).
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An agents way to reason his attitude formation policyis described by the
totality of reasoning rules he uses. We call it his reasoning system. Formally:
Denition 12 A reasoning system is a set S of reasoning rules. A constitution
C is closed under S if for each rule r = (P; c) in S, possession of the premises
implies possession of the conclusion, i.e., P  C ) c 2 C, or equivalently,
Cjr = C.
If one starts with a constitution C, and reasons using the rules in S, one
develops new attitudes, until ones constitution is closed under S, i.e., until no
rule in S has any e¤ect. We call the so-reached constitution the revision of C
through S:
Denition 13 The revision (or closure) of a constitution C through a
reasoning system S is the constitution CjS obtained from C by adding mental
states until the constitution is closed under S. Formally, CjS is the minimal
extension of C closed under S.5
The revised constitution CjS can be gradually constructed as follows: rst the
agent revises C through any rule r from S that is e¤ective, i.e., for which Cjr 6= C;
then he revises Cjr through any any other rule s in S that is e¤ective, i.e., for
which Cjrjs 6= Cjr; and so forth until no further rule in S is e¤ective. Formally:
Denition 14 A rule r = (P; c) is e¤ective on a constitution C if Cjr 6= C,
i.e., if P  C and c 62 C.
Remark 1 The revision CjS of a constitution C through a nite reasoning sys-
tem S equals the consecutively revised constitution Cjr1jr2    jrn for any maximal
sequence (r1; :::; rn) of S-rules in which each rule ri is e¤ective on the previous
constitution Cjr1j    jri 1.6
For instance, the revision of a constitution C through a three-rule reasoning
system S = fr; r0; r00g is CjS = Cjrjr0 if r is e¤ective on C, r0 is e¤ective on Cjr,
and r00 is not e¤ective on Cjrjr0, because (r; r0) is then maximal. The order of
revision may matter. Indeed, if r0 is not yet e¤ective on C, the opposite order of
revision yields the di¤erent result Cjr0jr = Cjr 6= CjS.
5This minimal extension exists and is unique, and it equals the intersecion of all exended
constitutions C 0  C that are closed under S.
6The sequence (r1; :::; rn) is not unique; so one may reasoon in di¤erent ways towards CjS.
But any two such maximal sequences (r1; :::; rn) and (r01; :::; r
0
m) involve the same number of rules
(i.e., m = n) and the same set of conclusions (i.e., each conclusion of some of r1; :::; rn is the
conclusion of some of r01; :::; r
0
m, and vice versa).
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7.2 Can we become consistent, complete and closed through
reasoning?
What would it mean to achieve one of the logical desiderata through reasoning?
Denition 15 Given a theory of rationality, a reasoning system S achieves con-
sistency, completeness, closedness, or (full) rationality if for each consti-
tution C the revision CjS is, respectively, consistent, complete, closed, or rational.
There would be little point in achieving completeness or closedness if one
thereby sacrices consistency, the arguably most basic and least sacriceableof
the three logical desiderata. We shall therefore always want the reasoning system
to preserve consistency, in the following sense:
Denition 16 Given a theory of rationality, a reasoning system S preserves
consistency if for each consistent constitution C its revision CjS is still consist-
ent.
Theorem 1 reduces the achievement of consistency, completeness, or closedness
to the achievement of certain types of requirements. Whether these types of re-
quirements are achievable is in turn addressed in the companion paper Dietrich et
al. (2017). As it turns out, Theorem 1 combined with results in the companion
paper implies that
 reasoning can achieve closedness while preserving consistency,
 reasoning cannot achieve consistency,
 reasoning can achieve completeness, but only while sacricing consistency.
Here is the formal statement:
Corollary 1 Given any theory of rationality,
(a) some reasoning system achieves closedness while preserving consistency,
(b) no reasoning system achieves consistency, unless the theory deems the max-
imal constitution C = M rational (so is degenerate),
(c) no reasoning system achieves completeness while preserving consistency, un-
less the theory deems each set of falsiable states avoidable,
(d) no reasoning system achieves full rationality, unless the theory deems the
maximal constitution C = M rational (so is degenerate).
The denitions of avoidableand falsiablein part (c) will be given shortly.
The word unlessin parts (b)(d) can be read not only in the sense of if it is not
the case that, but also in the stronger sense of if and only if it is not the case that.
So Corollary 1 in fact provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for when the
theory of rationality permits successful reasoning, in the four senses of achieving
consistency, completeness, closedness, or full rationality, respectively. In part (c),
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the stronger reading of unlesshowever requires that we assume compactness: each
inconsistent set of states C  M has a nite inconsistent subset. Compactness
holds trivially if M is nite. Compactness is the multi-attitude counterpart of
ordinary logical compactness.
We now discuss each part in turn.
Part (a): the achievability of closedness. By part (a), we can always become
closed in our attitudes through reasoning, without losing consistency. Why is this
so? By Theorem 1, closedness is reached once all closedness requirements of the
theory are met. A closedness requirement says: if you hold a certain set of states
P , then you hold a certain state c. This immediately suggests the reasoning rule
r = (P; c). If the reasoning system contains this rule, it achieves the corresponding
closedness requirement. The reasoning system consisting of all rules corresponding
to closedness requirements of the theory does the job, because it not only achieves
closedness, but also, as one can prove, preserves consistency. In practice, the same
job can be done by a much slimmer (and cognitively more plausible) reasoning
system, containing only the rules corresponding to certain closedness requirements
of the theory. Suppose for instance rationality requires that believing p and if p
then q implies believing q, and also that believing q implies intending r. Then
rationality also requires that believing p and if p then q implies intending r.
These are three closedness requirements. If your reasoning system contains the
rules corresponding to the rst two requirementsi.e., the rules
r = (f(p; bel); (if p then q; bel)g; (q; bel)) and r0 = (f(q; bel)g; (r; int)),
then you do not need the rule corresponding to the third requirement, i.e., the rule
r00 = (f(p; bel); (if p then q; bel)g; (r; int)),
because what r00 achieves (i.e., the third requirement) is also achieved through
applying rst r and then r0. Presumably, real people have simple and natural
rules in their reasoning systems, as would robots programmed to reason.
Part (b): the inachievability of consistency. Part (b) is mathematically
trivial, but philosophically disturbing. It is trivial (without even needing Theorem
1) because reasoning adds and never removes mental states, hence never renders
any inconsistent constitution consistent. The result is disturbing because consist-
ency is a more basic and minimalnormative desideratum than completeness and
closedness. One would have hoped that reasoning is at least able to repair incon-
sistencies. Instead reasoning can only create inconsistencies. The only exception is
a degeneratetheory that deems the maximal constitution C = M rational: here
there are no inconsistent constitutions, so that reasoning can do no harm.
Part (c): the inachievability of completeness. Why does part (c) hold?
By Theorem 1, completeness is reached once all completeness requirements of the
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theory are reached. Each completeness requirement demands having at least one
state from a given unavoidableset U . Formally:
Denition 17 Given a theory of rationality, a set of mental states is avoidable if
some rational constitution contains none of its states, and unavoidable otherwise.
Clearly, a constitution satises all completeness requirements R = fC : C \
U 6= ?g of the theory just in case it intersects with all unavoidable sets U . For
instance, the constitution might have to intersect with f(p; bel); (not p; bel)g, and
with f(p; int); (q; int); (r; int)g, and with many other unavoidable sets. There is
a trivial way to achieve this. For each unavoidable set U of the theory, pick an
(arbitrary) state m from U , and let the reasoning system contain the trivialrule
which always generates state m (formally, that rule is r = (?;m), with empty set
of premises). Through these rules, one acquires members of all unavoidable sets,
hence becomes complete.
This solution is unconvincing. It seems ad hoc, if not stubborn and blind, to
always adopt a xed belief (or intention etc.), regardless of ones existing web of
other beliefs (and intentions etc.). The problem can be put formally: applying
such rules can make the constitution inconsistent, because the newly formed belief
(or intention etc.) can clash with preexisting beliefs (or intentions etc.). If a
certain set of intentions is unavoidable, but each intention is inconsistent with
certain beliefs, then any reasoning rule that generates one of the intentions makes
the constitution inconsistent whenever that constitution happens to contain the
beliefs inconsistent with that intention.
We have just highlighted the problem that a reasoning rule (P;m) create an
inconsistency. This problem however only arises if one can nd other states with
which m is inconsistent, i.e., if m is falsiable:
Denition 18 Given a theory of rationality, a mental state m is falsiable if
some consistent constitution becomes inconsistent through adding m.
Usually most mental states are falsiable. For instance, as long as rationality
requires non-contradictory desires, any desire (p; des) is falsiable as f(p; des); (not
p; des)g is inconsistent.
Part (c) rules out theories for which all sets of falsiable states are avoidable,
because in such cases all unavoidable sets contain a non-falsiable state, so that
the problem illustrated above cannot arise.
Part (d): the inachievability of full rationality. Since consistency is un-
achievable by part (b), so is full rationality (which implies consistency). This of
course assumes the maximal constitution C = M is irrational. If that constitu-
tion is rational, rationality is trivially achievable through the maximalreasoning
system which contains all rules and thus generates the maximal constitution.
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8 The di¤erent way in which modal logic goes
beyond belief
Modal logic addresses multiple attitudes through modal operators such as belief
operators, desire operators, two-place preference operators, and the like. The kind
of attitudes (modal operators) depends on the modal logic in question; often there
are only few, but in principle there could be many (see classic expositions of Fagin
et al. 1995, ...). Modal logic is important, but pursues di¤erent goals than us and
Broome. We emphasize three di¤erences:
 Multiple attitudes inrather than towardspropositions. Modal
logic introduces attitudes at a di¤erent level, namely in the language for ex-
pressing propositions. Modal logic has propositions about multiple attitudes,
not multiple attitudes towards propositions. Modal logics can thus express
propositions such as I intend that p or I desire that I intend that p. By
contrast, we go beyond belief in the attitude towards propositions.
 Reasoning aboutrather than withattitudes. Modal logics are no
di¤erent from other logics in that logical entailments capture ordinary reas-
oning with beliefs, not multi-attitude reasoning (see Section 2). In modal
logic, one happens to reasons with beliefs about someones attitudes. This is
third-party reasoning about someones attitudes, not rst-person reasoning
with ones own attitudes. The di¤erence is real. Multi-attitude reason-
ing changes the agent in question (who acquires the new attitude), while
reasoning about that agents attitudes changes the analyst (who acquires a
belief about the agents attitudes). Multi-attitude reasoning creates these
attitudes, while reasoning about attitudes teaches something about them.
 Reduction impossible. There is no formal correspondence, translation,
or reduction between reasoning with ones own attitudes and third-party
reasoning about these attitudes. Why? Consider rst an instance of multi-
attitude reasoning: through intending q and believing that q only if he
intends p, the agent comes to intend p. One is tempted to translate this into
third-person reasoning about him through internalisingthe attitudes into
the propositions. This leads to the following inference about his attitudes:
he intends q; he believes q only if he intends p; therefore, he intends p.
The trouble is that this inference is not valid: the premises can be true
without the conclusion, as he may be irrational, as was indeed the case be-
fore he engaged in his reasoning. One might reply by assuming he must be
rational. This renders the third-person inference valid, but assumes away
the whole point of multi-attitude reasoning. Already rational agents need no
reasoning to improve their rationality. This brings us to another disanalogy
between the two sorts of reasoning: reasoning about someones attitudes is
(in most modal-logical systems) reasoning about rational attitudes, whereas
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multi-attitude reasoning makes sense for irrational agents who strive for ra-
tionality. Returning to the attempt of a reduction, let us see why also the
converse reduction fails. Consider this instance of reasoning about someones
attitudes: he intends p; he does not both intend p and desire q; therefore,
he does not desire q. Here there is not even an apparent translation into
rst-person multi-attitude reasoning, because in the inference neither the
premises nor the conclusion has a structure that would allow externalising
an attitude. The do not have the structure he has attitude a towards p, for
which one could externalizethe attitude a and turn the proposition into
the mental state (p; a).7
A Proof of Theorem 1
Throughout this appendix, we x a theory of rationality T and a constitution C.
Let T 6= ?, an assumption needed only for parts (a) and (b). We now prove each
part.
Part (a). We prove both directions of implication. We may assume C 6= ?,
since otherwise C is trivially consistent (as T 6= ?) and satises all consistency
requirements.
 First let C satisfy all consistency requirements of T . We show that C is
consistent. Consider the consistency requirement R of not holding all states
in C: formally, R = fC 0 : C 6 C 0g. Since C violates R while satisfying
all consistency requirements of T , R cannot be a consistency requirement
of T . So some rational constitution C 0 2 T violates R, i.e., C  C 0. So C
is consistent.
 Conversely, assume C is consistent. Consider any consistency requirement R
of T ; we must prove that C satises it. R takes the form R = fC 0 : F 6 C 0g
for some forbidden setF . Being consistent, C has a rational extension C+.
As C+ is rational, it satises all requirements of T . So C+ satises R, i.e.,
F 6 C+. As C  C+, it follows that F 6 C. So C satises R.
Part (b). The proof is the dualof that for part (a). We may suppose C 6= M ,
7Even for those special third-person inferences whose premises and conclusion have the special
structure i.e., state the presence of a mental state the translation makes little sense, because
it ignores the fundamental di¤erence between formingand inferring presence ofmental states,
and also because, according to Broomes account, rst-person reasoning is an operation on the
contents of mental states, not on (meta) propositions about having such-and-such attitudes
towards such-and-such states. Besides, someone who forms (say) an intention based on (say)
certain beliefs need not even be aware of having these beliefs and later this intention: he may
lack introspection about his mental states. Presumably we often form intentions without meta-
level awareness that we so do.
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because otherwise C is trivially conmplete (as T 6= ?) and satises all completeness
requirements.
 First let C satisfy all completeness requirements of T . We show that C is
complete. Note that C violates the (completeness) requirement of containing
a state outside C, i.e., the requirement R = fC 0 : (MnC) \ C 0 6= ?g. As C
satises all completeness requirements of T , R is not itself a completeness
requirement of T . So some rational constitution C 0 2 T violates R; hence
(MnC) \ C 0 = ?, i.e., C 0  C. So C is complete.
 Conversely, let C be complete. Let R be any completeness requirement of
T ; we show that C satises it. R requires to hold at least one states of a
certain (unavoidable) set U : R = fC 0 : C 0 \ U 6= ?g. As C is complete, it
has a rational subset C . Being rational, C  satises all requirements of T .
In particular, C  satises R, i.e., C  \ U 6= ?. Hence, as C   C, we have
C \ U 6= ?. So C satises R.
Part (c). We prove both directions of implication.
 First, assume C satises all closedness requirements of T . To show that C
is closed, consider a state m entailed by C; we must show that m 2 C.
Consider the closedness requirement R given by the set of premise states C
and the conclusion state m; formally, R = fC 0 : C  C 0 ) m 2 C 0g. As C
entails m, the theory makes the closedness requirement R. As C satises all
closedness requirements of the theory, C must satisfy R. Hence, as C  C,
we have m 2 C.
 Conversely, assume C is closed. Consider any closedness requirement R of
the theory, say R = fC 0 : P  C 0 ) c 2 C 0g for some (premise) set P  M
and some (conclusion) state c 2 M . To show that C satises R, assume
P  C; we must prove that c 2 C. Since R is a requirement of the theory,
all rational constitutions which include P contain c, which in turn means
that P entails c (by denition of entailment). So the larger set C  P also
entails c (again by denition of entailment). So c 2 C, as C is closed.
Part (d). Trivially, rationality is equivalent to satisfaction of the theorys strongest
requirement R = T , which is equivalent to satisfaction of all of the theorys re-
quirements R  T . 
B Proposition 1 formally re-stated and proved
Our claim to have generalized consistency, completeness and closedness from beliefs
towards multiple attitudes rests on Proposition 1, which we now re-state formally
and prove. This appendix section assumes the belief-only case A = fbelg and
the semantic or syntactic model of propositions (see Application A and B). So L
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consists of sets of worlds or logical sentences.8
A belief set is any set of propositions B  L (the believed propositions).
As belief is the only attitude  i.e., A = fbelg  constitutions are notational
variants of belief sets: to each constitution C corresponds a unique belief set
B = fp : (p; bel) 2 Cg, and to each belief set B corresponds a unique constitution
C = f(p; bel) : p 2 Bg.
Following the classical denitions, a belief set B  L is
 consistent if it is consistent, in the sense that \b2Bb 6= ? given the semantic
model or in the logical sense given the syntactic model, respectively,
 (deductively) closed if it contains all p 2 L which it entails, in the logical
sense given the syntactic model or in the sense that \b2Bb  p given the
semantic model, respectively,
 locally complete or simply complete if it contains a member of each proposition-
negation pair, i.e., each pair fp;:pg  L given the syntactic model or each
pair fp;
npg  L given the semantic model, respectively,
 globally complete if it contains a member of each exhaustive set Y  L. A
set Y  L is exhaustive if necessarily at least one member is true. i.e., if
its disjunction is tautological or equivalently the set of negations of proposi-
tions in Y is inconsistent in the semantic or syntactic sense, respectively.9
The simplest exhaustive sets are the proposition-negation pairs. Global com-
pleteness implies local completeness, by quantifying over all exhaustive sets,
not just over proposition-negation pairs. (Another equivalent denition of
globally completeis given in Lemma 1(b).)
The four conditions on belief sets are far from independent: any consistent
and complete belief set is automatically deductively closed and globally complete.
The gold standard of rational beliefs in logic is to satisfy all these conditions.
Translated this logical gold standard into our framework (with the belief-only case
A = fbelg), a constitution is rational just in case the corresponding belief set is
consistent and complete (and hence closed and globally complete). We call this
classicalrationality in the belief-only case. Formally:
Denition 19 In the belief-only case A = fbelg (with the semantic or syntactic
8In the syntactic case we assume that the logic is a standard propositional logic, or more
generally any well-behaved logic such as a standard propositional, predicate, modal, or condi-
tional logic. Formally, the logic must obey a few classic conditions (namely L1L4 in Dietrich
2007) which guarantee regularnotions of logical consistency and logical entailment. The not-
able condition is monotonicity, whereby entailments are preserved under adding premises, and
so consistency of a set is preserved under removing elements.
9In the semantic case, [p2Y p = 
 or equivalently \p2Y (
np) = ?. In the syntactic case,
_p2Y p is tautological or equivalently f:p : p 2 Y g is inconsistent (if the disjunction _p2Y p is
undened in the logic in question, e.g., because Y is innite, then only the denition in terms of
inconsistency of f:p : p 2 Y g can be used).
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model of L), the classical theory or notion of rationality is
T = fC : the belief set fp : (p; bel) 2 Cg is consistent & completeg:
We are ready to re-state Proposition 1 formally:
Proposition 1 Under the belief-only case A = fbelg (with the semantic or syn-
tactic model of L) and the classical theory of rationality, a constitution is
 consistent if and only if the corresponding belief set is consistent,
 complete if and only if the corresponding belief set is globally complete,
 closed if and only if the corresponding belief set is closed.10
Since complete constitutions correspond not to complete, but to strongly com-
plete belief sets, one might ask what type of constitutions correspond to locally
complete belief sets. The answer is obvious: those constitutions C such that each
proposition-negation pair in L has a member q such that (q; bel) 2 C.
To prove the result, we rst show that the notions of consistency, strong com-
pleteness and closedness for belief sets can be re-described in a way that corres-
ponds precisely to our denitions of consistency, completeness and closedness for
constitutions. The result should be partly familiar to logicians:
Lemma 1 Given the semantic or syntactic model of L, a belief set B  L is
(a) consistent if and only if B  B0 for some complete and consistent belief set
B0  L,
(b) strongly complete if and only if B  B0 for some complete and consistent
belief set B0,
(c) closed if and only if B contains each proposition contained in all complete
and consistent extensions B0  B (equivalently, B is the intersection of these
extensions).11
Proof. Suppose the lemmas assumptions. Let B  L be a belief set, and B the
set of complete and consistent belief sets.
(a) We distinguish between the semantic and syntactic model of L. In the
semantic case the equivalence holds trivially (if B is consistent, we can pick a
w 2 \p2Bp and dene B0 as fp 2 L : w 2 pg). In the syntactic case the equivalence
follows from a basic property in logic, often referred to as Lindenbaums lemma,
which states that any consistent set of sentences in a logic is extendable to a
complete and still consistent set. This property holds in well-behaved logics of the
sort assumed here (see footnote 8).
(b) First let B have a subset B0 2 B. To show that B is strongly complete,
consider any exhaustive set Y  L. We must prove that B \ Y 6= ?. As B0  B
10In the syntactic case we assume the logic is well-behaved as dened in footnote 8.
11In case of the syntactic model we assume the logic is well-behaved as dened in footnote 8.
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it su¢ ces to show that Y \ B0 6= ?, which holds by the following argument to be
spell out for the syntactic and the semantic case:
 In the syntactic case, note that the (inconsistent) set f:p : p 2 Y g cannot
be a subset of the (consistent) set B0. So there is a p 2 Y such that :p 62 B0,
and thus p 2 B0 as B0 is complete. So Y \B0 6= ?.
 In the semantic case, since f
np : p 2 Y g has empty intersection (as Y has
union 
) while B0 has non-empty intersection (as B0 is consistent), the set
f
np : p 2 Y g cannot be a subset of B0. So there is a p 2 Y such that

np 62 B0, and hence p 2 B0 as B0 is complete. So Y \B0 6= ?.
Conversely, assume that B does not include any B0 2 B, and let us show
that B is not strongly complete. By assumption, for each B0 2 B we may pick
a pB0 2 B0nB. Let Y := fpB0 : B0 2 Bg. This set Y is exhaustive, both in the
semantic case (here each world ! 2 
 belongs to some member of Y , namely to
pB0 with B0 := fp 2 L : ! 2 pg) and also in the syntactic case (here f:p : p 2 Y g
is not included in any B0 2 B and so is inconsistent by (a)). Yet Y \ B = ? by
construction of Y . So B is not strongly complete.
(c) We must show that B is closed if and only if B = \B02B:B0BB0. In
the syntactic case, this is a familiar fact, valid in in well-behaved logics of the
sort considered here (see footnote 8). Now consider the semantic case. Note
that \B02B:B0BB0 is closed (in fact, not just in the semantic case). So if B =
\B02B:B0BB0 then B is automatically closed. Conversely, if B is closed, then
B = fp 2 L : p  \q2Bqg, from which it easily follows that B = \B02B:B0BB0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the propositions assumptions. Let C be a
constitution. We denote the content of a (belief) state m by bm and the belief set
corresponding to a constitution C M by bC = fbm : m 2 Cg.
First,
C is consistent , C  C 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC cC 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC  B for some consistent and complete B  L
, bC is consistent, by Lemma 1(a).
Second,
C is complete , C  C 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC cC 0 for some C 0 2 T
, bC  B for some consistent and complete B  L
, bC is strongly complete, by Lemma 1(b).
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Third, writing bT := f bC : C 2 Tg = fB  L : B is complete and consistentg,
C is closed , C 3 m for all m entailed by C, i.e., all m 2 \C02T :C0CC 0
, bC 3 bm for all m entailed by C, i.e., all m 2 \C02T :C0CC 0
, bC 3 b for all b entailed by bC, i.e., all b 2 \B2bT :B bCB
, bC is closed, by Lemma 1(c). 
C Proof of Corollary 1
Throughout the proof, let T be any theory of rationality. Generalizing Denition
15, we say that a reasoning system S achieves a requirement R if CjS satises
R for all constitutions C. Note that for each of parts (b), (c) and (d) we have to
prove two directions of implication, as we read unlessas if and only if it is not
the case that.
Given the contradictory theory T = ?, all four parts hold trivially. Part (a)
holds because the maximal reasoning system S, which contains all rules, does the
job: it achieves closedness by transforming each constitution into M (the only
closed constitution), and it vacuously preserves consistency by the absence of con-
sistent constitutions. Parts (b), (c) and (d) hold because consistency, completeness
and rationality are all trivially inachievable by the absence of any consistent, com-
plete or rational constitutions (regarding (c), note also the absence of avoidable
sets).
Henceforth let T 6= ?. We prove the four parts in turn.
Part (a). By Theorem 1(c), achieving closedness is equivalent to achieving all
closedness requirements of T . Meanwhile, by Theorem 1 of the companion paper
there exists a reasoning schema S which achieves all closedness requirements and
preserves consistency. So S achieves closedness while preserving consistency.
Part (b). First, in the (degenerate) case that the maximal constitution C = M
is rational, all constitutions are consistent, and so consistency is trivially achieved
by any reasoning system. Conversely, assume the maximal constitution C = M
is irrational. Let S be any reasoning system; we show that it fails to achieve
consistency. As M is irrational, there is an inconsistent constitution C (e.g.,
C = M). As CjS  C, also CjS is inconsistent.
Part (c). First, assume avoidability of each set of falsiable states (along with
the background assumption of compactness, whereby each inconsistent set of states
has a nite inconsistent subset). For each unavoidable set U we can pick a non-
falsiable state mU 2 U . The reasoning system S = f(?;mU) : U is unavoidableg
achieves each completeness requirement of theory T , because for each completeness
requirement of T a state from its unavoidable set is formed. So S achieves com-
pleteness simpliciter, by Theorem 1. We now show that S preserves consistency.
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For a contradiction, consider a consistent constitution C such that CjS is inconsist-
ent. By compactness, CjS has a nite inconsistent subset C 0. By denition of S,
CjS = C [fmU : U is an unavoidable setg: So we may pick nitely many unavoid-
able sets U1; :::; Uk such that C 0  C [ fmU1 ;mU2 ; :::;mUkg. Since C is consistent,
so is C[fmU1g, asmU1 is non-falsiable; hence so is C[fmU1 ;mU2g, asmU2 is non-
falsiable. Repeating this argument k times, it follows that C[fmU1 ;mU2 ; :::;mUkg
is consistent. Hence its subset C 0 is consistent.
Conversely, suppose some set of falsiable states is unavoidable. Let R be the
corresponding completeness requirement. It su¢ ces to show that no reasoning
system achieves R, because by Theorem 1 achieving completeness is equivalent
to achieving all completeness requirements of the theory. By Theorem 3 in the
companion paper, no reasoning system achieves any completeness requirement of
the theory whose unavoidable set consists of falsiable states. So no reasoning
system S achieves R.
Part (d). First, for (degenerate) theories that deem C = M rational, rationality
is trivially achieved by the reasoning system S containing all rules, for which
CjS = M for all initial constitutions C. Conversely, if C = M is irrational, the
inachievability of rationality follows from that of the weaker demand of consistency
(see part (b)). 
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